CySec Researchers Present Five Papers at ACM CCS 2026
The ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS) is the flagship conference of ACM’s Special Interest Group on Security, Audit and Control (SIGSAC) and a premier venue for breakthrough work in systems and network security, cryptography, privacy, security engineering, and real-world deployments. With a highly selective review process and a broad international audience, ACM CCS showcases state-of-the-art research, fosters cross-sector collaboration, and sets the agenda for the cybersecurity field. ACM CCS 2026 takes place November 15-19, 2026, in The Hague, The Netherlands.
CYSEC researchers are presenting five papers at the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2026), showcasing advances in blockchain scalability, secure transactions, and cryptographic verification. Their work combines cryptographic theory, formal verification, and protocol engineering to address practical challenges, from reducing transaction costs and improving blockchain performance to strengthening privacy and security guarantees.
A major advance in making Bitcoin more accessible across blockchain networks is presented in “BitVM3: Efficient Bitcoin Bridges via Garbled Circuits,” by Robin Linus Woll (Stanford University), Ioannis Alexopoulos (TU Wien), Lukas Aumayr (University of Edinburgh), Zeta Avarikioti and Matteo Maffei (TU Wien), and David Tse (Stanford University). The research tackles a key obstacle to Bitcoin’s wider use: securely transferring assets between different blockchains without relying on expensive verification procedures or highly trusted intermediaries. The proposed BitVM3-bridge uses garbled circuits to move complex verification off-chain, dramatically reducing the cost of resolving disputes. Compared with its predecessor, BitVM2, the approach cuts worst-case on-chain dispute costs from approximately $16,000 to around $5, a reduction of more than 3,000 times. This improvement could make secure Bitcoin bridges accessible to smaller operators by reducing the financial guarantees required to participate. The system supports connections to networks such as Ethereum and Bitcoin rollups, expanding opportunities to use Bitcoin in decentralized applications.
Beyond cross-chain transfers, Bitcoin faces another critical challenge: scaling its transaction capacity to support wider adoption. “Ark: Offchain Transaction Batching in Bitcoin,” by Pim Keer and Matteo Maffei (TU Wien), Marco Argentieri and Andrew Camilleri (Ark Labs), and Zeta Avarikioti (TU Wien), presents a solution that could make Bitcoin payments faster, cheaper, and easier to use. Unlike existing systems such as the Lightning Network, which require users to lock funds and manage payment channels, Ark allows payments to be received without prior on-chain setup. Transactions are processed off-chain and grouped into compact blockchain records, substantially reducing the amount of data that must be stored on Bitcoin. Importantly, users retain the ability to withdraw their funds independently of the operator. The researchers formally prove the protocol’s security and identify two vulnerabilities that have since been fixed in the mainnet implementation. Their evaluation shows that arbitrarily large batches of virtual Bitcoin outputs can be represented by an on-chain commitment of approximately 197 virtual bytes, demonstrating the potential for more scalable Bitcoin payments.
While these two papers focus on making blockchain infrastructure more practical, “Automated Reasoning for Indistinguishability in the CCSA,” by Simon Jeanteur, Laura Kovács, and Matteo Maffei (TU Wien), and Michael Rawson (University of Southampton), addresses the fundamental challenge of proving that cryptographic systems are actually secure. Even widely used security protocols can contain subtle flaws that are difficult to detect through conventional testing. The researchers introduce CryptoVampire2, an automated tool capable of verifying indistinguishability, a security property essential for protecting privacy and ensuring that attackers cannot distinguish between different protocol executions. Its novel reasoning engine, golgge, makes complex cryptographic proofs more efficient and reduces the need for manual expert analysis. In experiments, CryptoVampire2 successfully automated all supported indistinguishability queries from the Sqirrel protocol library, completing each proof in less than 2 minutes and 15 seconds on ordinary computer hardware. The work represents an important step toward making rigorous cryptographic security verification more accessible and scalable.
The reliability of blockchain networks also depends on whether participants follow the rules of consensus protocols. “Doubly Aggregatable Signatures,” co-authored by Georg Fuchsbauer (TU Wien), Pranav Garimidi, Joachim Neu, and Ertem Nusret Tas (a16z Crypto Research), Guru-Vamsi Policharla (Commonware, Inc.), and Max Resnick (Anza), introduces a cryptographic mechanism that makes participation in blockchain consensus more transparent and verifiable. In decentralized networks, some participants may avoid the cost of distributing votes while relying on others to keep the system running. The proposed doubly aggregatable signatures provide compact cryptographic evidence of which votes participants have received, making it possible to verify their involvement and design more effective incentives for timely communication. The researchers develop two efficient constructions and demonstrate their performance in a Rust implementation. The approach could help improve the reliability and efficiency of high-performance blockchain networks without introducing excessive verification overhead.
A related question is how to guarantee that cryptographic building blocks remain secure when combined into larger applications. “Universally Composable Adaptor Signatures,” by Paul Gerhart and Dominique Schröder (TU Wien), and Daniel Rausch (University of Stuttgart), strengthens the theoretical foundations of secure blockchain transactions. Adaptor signatures enable conditional transactions in which a digital signature can be completed only when a specified cryptographic condition is fulfilled. Such mechanisms are particularly useful for applications involving coordinated payments and exchanges. However, security guarantees established for individual cryptographic components do not necessarily remain valid when those components interact within complex protocols. The researchers identify fundamental weaknesses in an earlier security model and introduce a new framework based on Universal Composability, providing stronger guarantees for integrated systems. They also construct an efficient Schnorr-based adaptor signature scheme compatible with existing infrastructure, offering a practical foundation for more secure Bitcoin-based applications.